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Abstract
We present an agent-based model of a multi-tier energy market. We
show how reward interdependence between strategic business units within
a vertically integrated firm can increase its profits in oligopolistic energy
markets. The eﬀects are shown to be distinct from those of the raising
rivals’ costs model. In our case, higher prices relate to the nature of energy
markets, which facilitate the emergence of financial netback eﬀects.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the vertical relationships between gas and electricity markets.
Vertical relationships are those that involve an exchange between sequential
stages of the value chain. In the energy industry, gas is an important input
for electricity generation, and therefore wholesale natural gas and electricity
markets are vertically interrelated. The same is true for wholesale and retail
electricity markets since retailers buy electricity from wholesalers (Stern 1998).
Vertical interactions may involve separate firms or diﬀerent strategic business
units (SBUs) within the same firm (Gulati et al. 2005). Vertical integration
is widespread among European energy firms. Gas producers often own gas-
fired power plants, and many electricity firms consist of generation and retail
SBUs (Finon and Midttun 2004). Mergers between gas and electricity firms
are relatively new in the United States, but they are occurring at a rapid pace
(Hunger 2003). Moreover, the merger activity appears to be accelerating as
competition opportunities expand, incentive regulation diﬀuses more widely,
and regulators have become less hostile to mergers (Joskow 2000).
Several streams of literature have studied the advantages as well as the
disadvantages of vertical integration. Industrial economists have extensively
analysed whether vertically related firms could benefit from foreclosing non-
integrated rivals (see Rey and Tirole 2004 for a recent survey).1 Ordover et al.
(1990), for example, show that a vertically integrated firm in a bilateral duopoly
may benefit from disadvantaging its downstream rival.2 The argument runs as
follows. If the upstream unit ceases to sell in the input market, its upstream
rival will face less competition and raise prices. Higher input prices increase
the costs of the non-integrated downstream rival. This firm is forced to reduce
production and increase prices. As a result, the vertically integrated firm can
increase profits by raising both its end-user market share and price.3
Studies of vertical relationships in energy markets (e.g. Granitz and Klein
1996, Bushnell et al. 2005) often explain their findings using this foreclosure
argument. However, its logic depends crucially on the firm’s ability either to
internalise transactions or to set an internal transfer price that is diﬀerent from
the external (input) market price. In practice, wholesale energy markets are
often compulsory, so trading internalisation is not feasible. Moreover, the stan-
dard energy market mechanism is the uniform price auction, which seems to
1Management scholars have identified several other motives for firms to integrate vertically
(Harrigan 1984 and 1986), including the reduction of transaction costs (Williamson 1975,
Mahoney 1992), the reduction of corporate risk (Chatterjee et al. 1992) and the elimination
of the double marginalisation ineﬃciency (see e.g. Gaudet and van Long 1996).
2 Salinger (1988), on the other hand, analyses whether vertical integration leads to higher
or lower prices in a successive oligopoly setting.
3Ordover et al. assumed that the vertically integrated firm can commit to limit its supplies
to the downstream rivals and that the upstream competitor can charge only linear prices.
Several authors have relaxed some of their assumptions. In particular, Choi and Yi (2000)
and Ma (1997) dispense in diﬀerent settings with the commitment assumption, although not
with the linear pricing one. Allowing for a broader set of tariﬀs, Hart and Tirole (1990) show
that vertical integration may also benefit the integrated firms if the upstream unit is more
eﬃcient than its competitors.
1
Page 3 of 19
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
make diﬀerences between internal and external prices impossible at the outset.
Thus, two of the main resting points of the foreclosure or raising rivals’ costs
logic are often not present in energy markets.
This paper introduces an agent-based simulation model of natural gas and
electricity markets. We show how corporate incentives linking the strategic
business units within a vertically integrated firm can increase prices in energy
markets. The eﬀects are shown to be diﬀerent from those arising in the standard
models of vertical foreclosure. In our case, higher prices are related to the
existence of financial netback eﬀects in energy markets.
Wholesale natural gas is often priced against wholesale electricity prices,
which, in turn, are usually set with reference to retail tariﬀs. Industry players
refer to this financial process as netback or spark spread pricing. The use
of netback pricing is well documented in the energy markets literature (for an
early discussion see Moxnes 1987) and suggests a sequential relationship between
energy markets in which gas and electricity markets are cleared in a down-to-
upstream sequence. This is in contrast to the Ordover et al.’s "physical flow"
formulation, widely adopted by the foreclosure literature, whereby upstream
prices are determined before those downstream.
Trading is not a simple sequential procedure in most industry supply chains,
as it is often iterative and tentative before deals are struck, so that modeling
it either way is an abstraction. However, in the energy case, there are good
reasons to support netback pricing rather than the physical flow formulation.
First, retail prices are generally fixed for longer periods of time than upstream
prices. For example, in the UK, retail consumers cannot change supplier during
the first twenty eight days of signing a contract, but upstream prices vary every
half hour. Therefore, retailers and generators take downstream prices as given
when trading in the wholesale market.4 Second, electricity is non-storable,
consumption and generation have to be balanced at all times, but end-users are
free to choose volume. As a consequence, information on retail consumption
volumes has to flow upwards in the supply chain via prices.5
In this context, it seems plausible that widely used vertical incentives should
play a role on the determination of energy prices. The general reward system
of an organisation influences the behavioural choices of its members. Bonuses
tied to overall profits create incentives for cooperative behaviour both between
individuals (Zander and Wolfe, 1964; Wageman and Baker, 1997) and across de-
4 In contrast, in other markets, one can argue that upstream producers fix their prices
before downstream firms compete. In the typical example of a producer and a retailer, the
retailer buys from the producer and then competes in the downstream market. As such, the
downstream firm would take the upstream price as given (the item is already bought).
5 In practice there are several cycles of this. Ahead of real-time, retailers will make forecasts
of demand and seek to contract power to cover it. Generators will make forecasts of output and
purchase fuels to cover it. In real time, end-user demand is discretionary but at a preset fixed
price. Retailers will have to cover imbalances between their contract and actual oﬀtake at the
spot electricity imbalance price, which is actually set slightly ex post depending upon what
the system operator has to purchase in real time to ensure system stability. Similarly, there
will be real-time energy balancing in the gas network adapting to what the power stations
have had to do.
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partments within a firm (Petersen 1992, Kretschmer and Puranam forthcoming).
For individuals, the more interdependent the task, the more interdependent the
reward system should be (Wageman and Baker) because it results in a positive
relationship between eﬀectiveness of the integrative devices and organisational
performance (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). For firms, the importance of cooper-
ation between SBUs grows with their interdependence (Gulati and Singh 1998)
and the higher the inter-unit synergies, the more useful the collaborative incen-
tives are (Kretschmer and Puranam). Collaborative incentives, however, not
only encourage cooperation but may also enhance free riding. Indeed, rewards
based on aggregate profits hinder the identification of individual performances.
As a consequence, individuals have more incentives to shirk hoping that the
others will compensate (Holmstrom 1982, Petersen 1992).6
Despite the importance of collaborative incentives, the existing literature
provides no guidance as to how they should be given to sequential SBUs in
vertically integrated energy firms. In order to fill this gap, we consider a setting
consisting of two sequential, multiple-unit, compulsory, uniform-price auctions
representing a wholesale and a retail energy market. Although quite realistic,
this complex trading environment presents a manifold of non-Pareto ranked
Nash equilibria (von der Fehr and Harbord 1993). To achieve predictions, we
adopt an inductive selection method based on the adaptive theory of reinforce-
ment learning put forward by Roth and Erev (1995).
The agent-based simulations show that coordination overcomes the poten-
tial disadvantages of broad collaborative incentives due to the large interdepen-
dences between energy markets. More importantly, our results uncover a simple
but powerful mechanism to exert vertical market power. Using collaborative
incentives that link the reward to the performance of the diﬀerent SBUs, ver-
tically integrated firms induce higher prices and achieve higher profit. These
observable outcomes are similar to those of the foreclosure argument. Closer in-
spection, however, reveals that our downstream SBU behaves less competitively,
increasing downstream prices at the expense of market share rather than taking
advantage of the rivals’ higher costs, as in the foreclosure argument. Moreover,
the upstream SBU behaves more competitively and benefits from the higher
prices downstream.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the
agent-based simulation model. Section 3 presents the results, which are ex-
tended in Section 4. A short discussion follows in Section 5.
2 The Computational Model
2.1 General Setting
The model incorporates key features of energy markets in the short-run. Con-
sider two sequential, oligopolistic markets, a “wholesale” and a “retail” market.
6Broad incentives could also obstruct learning since it is more diﬃcult to identify the most
successful business strategies.
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They can represent a wholesale and a retail electricity market. Alternatively,
one can think of wholesale gas and electricity markets, whereby gas sold in the
gas market is an input for the generation of electricity. In the wholesale market,
there are A wholesalers that sell energy to B retailers. These, in turn, re-sell
this energy in the end-user market.7 Marginal costs are assumed to be con-
stant throughout and normalised to 0 for simplicity. There are no transmission
constraints or storage.
Firms are assumed to be capacity constrained. Generators, for example, are
limited by the aggregated maximum capacity of their power plants. Wholesale
gas sales are also typically constrained by long-term contracts signed between
gas producers and shippers, together with high penalties to discourage over-
utilization of the network. As a stylization to isolate the eﬀects emerging from
vertical incentives, we focus on the situation in which capacity is equal across
tiers (i.e. there are no particular bottlenecks in the supply chain). Moreover,
firms in each tier are assumed to be identical. Hence, if one denotes market
capacity asK, the individual wholesaler capacity isKw = KA and that of retailer
Kr = KB .
2.2 Market Rules
Goods are traded repeatedly along the value chain (Figure 1). In a given round
t, two uniform price auctions take place, first at the retail and then at the whole-
sale level, following the netback pricing sequence. In each market i, i ∈ {r, w},
trading occurs as follows. Suppliers simultaneously submit single price bids at
which they are willing to sell (up to) their capacity, starting from 0 and up
to P
i
(t), a maximum level for each market described below. An independent
auctioneer determines the uniform market price P i(t) by intersecting the ad hoc
supply function with the corresponding demand curve, Qi(t). The independent
auctioneer assigns full capacity, qij(t) = K
i, to the m sellers with bids below
the market price; the remaining capacity, qij(t) = Q
i(t) −mKi, to the sellers
with bids equal to the market price;8 and zero sales, qij(t) = 0, to those submit-
ting above the market price. The price and the individual quantities are then
communicated independently to each supplier.
We follow the usual simplification of modeling retail demand as fully inelas-
tic. The literature has established the extremely low price elasticity of short
term electricity demand, originating among others from the lack of real-time
metering systems (e.g. Stoft 2002). In particular, the inelastic market demand
Qr(t) is drawn, independently in each round, from a uniform distribution in
[Q¯r − ε, Q¯r + ε], where Q¯r is the expected end-user demand and ε accounts for
the small uncertainty typical in day-ahead forecasting. We assume that there al-
ways is overall overcapacity, Q¯r+ ε < K, consistent with the normal operations
7Although relevant in the medium term, we do not deal with entry and exit of firms,
variation in expected end-user demand or capacity expansion.
8 In case of a tie, the selling firm is selected randomly.
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Figure 1: Sequential clearing of the market simulation.
of most de-regulated energy markets.9 Hence, our model excludes blackouts due
to extreme weather or technical failure.
Possible retail prices are bounded between (0,Ψ], with Ψ being the maximum
reasonable end-user price, and therefore P
r
(t) = Ψ.10 Retail commitments are
honoured with purchases in the wholesale market. The retailers’ aggregated
demand curve in the wholesale market is equal to the market demand if the price
is below the retail price, Qw(t) = Qr(t) if Pw(t) ≤ P r(t), and zero otherwise,
Qw(t) = 0 if Pw(t) > P r(t). Accordingly, wholesalers submit bids bounded
between (0, P r(t)] and P
w
(t) = P r(t).
Profits for each firm type are
πwa (t) = P
w(t) qwa (t) for a = 1...A (1)
πrb(t) = [P
r(t)− Pw(t)] qrb (t) for b = 1...B. (2)
There are apparently no other multi-tier simulations driven by netback prin-
ciples in the energy modelling literature. This new method is the paper’s main
methodological contribution.
2.3 Vertical Integration and Reward Interdependence
In the basic model, it is assumed that a wholesaler (without loss of generality,
a = 1) and a retailer (b = 1) are vertically integrated in that they belong to
9For example, the UK energy system includes a reserve margin of about 20% of expected
peak demand.
10This upper price ceiling can be understood as a limit triggering regulatory intervention or
the cost of alternative, expensive, peaking load fuels to which the system administrator could
switch at short notice if prices exceed Ψ.
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the same organisational structure (i.e. the same firm). Trading is compulsory
and firms are not allowed to price discriminate or set an internal transfer price.
However, the vertically integrated firm can influence its traders’ decisions with
incentives depending not only on their own SBU profits, but also on those of
the other SBUs,
Ωw1 (t) = (1− α)πw1 (t) + απr1(t) and (3)
Ωr1(t) = (1− α)πr1(t) + απw1 (t), (4)
where α = {0, .01, .02, ..., .5} parameterises the “reward interdependence” (Wage-
man and Baker) between the two vertically related SBUs. A small α represents
narrow incentives, which become broader for growing α. Note that for α = 0,
Ωw1 (t) = πw1 (t) and Ωr1(t) = πr1(t), and SBUs trade as if they were indepen-
dent. For tractability and realism, the model is restricted to the case in which
SBUs are rewarded predominantly on the basis of their own performance (i.e.
α ≤ 0.5).
Managers in the non-integrated firms do not have reward interdependences,
so their incentives are correlated to their own unit performance,
Ωij(t) = π
i
j(t) for i = {w, r} and j 6= 1. (5)
2.4 Bidding and Behavioural Learning
The feasible price oﬀer domain for each firm is approximated by a discrete
grid consisting of a fixed number of possible actions (independent of t). In
each trading period, suppliers choose among Si possible prices, equally spaced
between the minimum and the maximum price oﬀer, (0, P
i
(t)]. Hence, the set
of possible actions, Ai at a tier i in a period t is given by
Ai(t) = s ∗
Ã
P
i
(t)
Si
!
for s = 1, ..., Si. (6)
Notice that in the wholesale market, the set of possible prices changes over time.
In both markets, actions with a lower s are more competitive or closer to the
marginal costs.
Each trader plays each possible action with a given likelihood or “propen-
sity”, rij,s. The probability that an agent j plays an action s is given by its
propensity divided by the sum of the propensities of all possible actions,
pij,s(t) =
rij,s(t)PSi
s=1 r
i
j,s(t)
. (7)
Propensities for all actions are initialised to the firms’ maximum profit, rij,s(1) =
ΨKi for all s and i, so that all actions have the same initial probability, pij,s(1) =
1
Si for all s and i.
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At the end of each round, traders reinforce the selected action, k, through
an increase in its propensity equivalent to the performance, Ωij(t). Moreover,
actions that are similar, k − 1 and k + 1, are also reinforced, by Ωij(t) ∗ (1− δ)
where 0 < δ < 1 (“persistent local experimentation” in the terminology of Roth
and Erev). All propensities are discounted by γ (“gradual forgetting”), and
actions whose probability falls below a certain threshold are removed from the
space of choice (“extinction in finite time”). Summarising, the pre-extinction
propensities ri0j,s are
ri0j,s(t) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
(1− γ) rij,s(t− 1) +Ωij(t) if s = k
(1− γ) rij,s(t− 1) + (1− δ) Ωij(t) if s = k − 1 or s = k + 1
(1− γ) rij,s(t− 1) if s 6= k − 1, s 6= k and s 6= k + 1,
and the final propensities, corrected by the extinction feature, are
rij,s(t) = r
i0
j,s(t)I{ r
i0
j,s(t)
SSi
s=1 r
i0
j,s(t)
>μ}
(8)
where I is an indicator function that takes value 1 if the condition between
brackets is satisfied and zero otherwise.
2.5 Simulation Parameters
In the first instance, industry structure is simplified to consist of two wholesalers
and three retailers (i.e. A = 2; B = 3). Remember that the two vertically
integrated entities are denoted by a = 1 and b = 1. Total capacity is set to
K = 300 so that the individual capacity of a wholesaler is Kw = 150 and of
a retailer Kr = 100. Expected market demand is Q¯r = 240 and ε = 5, and
hence there is an expected excess capacity of 20% with about 5% uncertainty
in the day-ahead forecasted demand, approximately of the magnitude observed
in energy markets. The end-user reasonable price ceiling is set at Ψ = 200.
We study fifty-one reward interdependence cases α = {0, .01, .02, .03, ..., .50}
with 50 simulation runs consisting of 500 periods each. The data consists of
averages for the last 200 periods for each run and case. These represent long
term stationary values to which the three markets converge, based on the Roth
and Erev reinforcement parameters.11’12
3 Results
This section describes the simulation results. We report first the results on
market prices and firm profits. We then turn to the analysis of firm behaviour,
11For each level of reward interdependence (α), the one-lag with trend Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test-statistics for both wholesale and retail price series are lower than −10. Given that
the 95% critical value is −3.43, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is always rejected.
12The Roth and Erev parameters used throughout are γ = 0.01, δ = 0.5 and μ = 0.0005.
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Figure 2: Wholesale prices
reporting the individual price setting frequencies and latent probability distri-
butions. Based on the individual behaviour analysis, we provide in the last
subsection an intuitive explanation of our market outcomes.
3.1 Market Prices and Profits
Figures 2 and 3 report the 95% mean confidence intervals of simulated prices
in the two sequential markets. They present the relationship between reward
interdependence (α, on the horizontal axis) and the wholesale and retail prices
(Pw and P r, on the vertical axis), respectively. As shown by Figure 2, whole-
salers coordinate on higher prices as α grows. The lack of reward interde-
pendence between the integrated wholesaler and retailer (α = 0) results in an
average wholesale price of approximately 95 monetary units, which increases to
about 102 units for overall performance-based incentives (α = .50). That is, if
the SBUs of the vertically integrated firm traded as if they were independent,
wholesale market prices would be lower.
Figure 3 shows that retail prices are also increasing in the level of reward
interdependence. When α = 0, the simulation produces an average price of
about 132; for α = .50 it is about 148. As a result, the expected absolute
size of the resource rent shared by the two tiers (= P rQ
r
) also increases. The
proportion accruing to the retailers, however, does not increase. Retail prices
increase only to compensate the higher wholesale prices. Increasing wholesale
prices with constant production costs results in a higher proportion of the rent
staying with the wholesale duopoly.
As a consequence, α influences both the profits of the vertically integrated
8
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Figure 3: Retail prices.
Figure 4: Profit, vertically integrated firm.
9
Page 11 of 19
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
firm and its two SBUs (Figure 4). Although broader vertical incentives do not
increase the profits of its retail unit, they increase those of its wholesale unit.
The resulting overall corporate profit (πw1 +π
r
1) is clearly increasing from about
14,300 monetary units to over 16,000. Thus, there is a positive relationship
between vertical reward interdependence across the two strategic business units,
the firm’s overall profit and the concentration of profit upstream.
Summarising, as in Ordover et al., wholesale and retail prices increase as
a result of vertical integration. Indeed, the vertically integrated firm achieves
higher profit by using rewards based on overall firm performance. With this
type of reward interdependence, prices are higher than if the two business units
had been independent.
In order to provide an explanation for these results one needs to explore the
individual behaviour of firms, to which we turn next.
3.2 Price-setting Behaviour
In a uniform auction, prices are determined by the last bid on the merit order,
and therefore being a marginal seller is a necessary condition to influence prices.
Hence, the frequency with which each firm takes the marginal price-setting
position on the supply merit order represents one dimension of its predisposition
to exert market power (at the expense of market share).
The vertical axes in Figures 5 and 6 provide averages over the frequencies
with which each market player sets the price in the 200 end-of-simulation periods
averaged across the 50 simulation runs. An increase in the reward interdepen-
dence in the vertically integrated firm creates two simultaneous eﬀects. On the
one hand, the proportion of trading periods in which the wholesale unit sets
prices goes down from about 50% when α = 0 to less than 40% when α = 0.5
(Figure 5). As in Ordover et al., vertical integration provides incentives for
the wholesale unit to concede market power upstream and, as a result, for the
competitor to push up the wholesale price.
On the other hand, the proportion of trading periods in which the integrated
retail unit is price-setting increases from 33% when α = 0 to about 50% for
α = 0.5 (Figure 6). As a result, there is a negative relationship between α and
the retail unit’s market share, which is at odds with Ordover et al.’s findings.
3.3 Latent Intensity of Competition
A similar behaviour can be identified in the Si end-of-simulation individual la-
tent probability distributions from which agents choose bids, depicted in Figures
7 and 8. The concentration of probabilities is largely invariant across a large
number of periods once the market reaches convergence, so the distributions on
the last trading period are an indication of the firms’ long-term mixed strategies.
On the horizontal axes, strategies are identified with numbers ranging from
1 for the more competitive to 100 for the highest possible bid. Cumulative
probabilities for the two tiers are calculated on the vertical axes for each el-
ement of the strategy space. The curves summarise the cumulative bidding
10
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Figure 5: Wholesalers’ price-setting frequencies.
Figure 6: Retailers’ price-setting frequencies.
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Figure 7: End of simulation distribution of strategies of wholesalers.
Figure 8: End of simulation distribution of strategies of retailers.
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probabilities for α = 0 and α = 0.5, averaged across the 50 simulation runs.
In all cases, probabilities concentrated on lower and higher strategies result in
the agents behaving more and less competitively, respectively. That is, curve
movements to the upper-left and lower-right corners are indications of more and
less competition, respectively.13
The figures oﬀer a number of insights linking individual probability distrib-
utions to market outcomes. First, the wholesalers’ distributions are very similar
under α = 0 but become diﬀerent under α = 0.5 (Figure 7). Reward interdepen-
dence incentives in the vertically integrated firm have the eﬀect of making the
integrated wholesaler’s bids more competitive (upper-left movement). More-
over, the rival wholesaler’s prior is slightly less competitive (movement to the
lower-right). Market power is concentrated on the non-integrated wholesaler.
Second, probability distributions on the retailer side are similar for all firms
under α = 0 (Figure 8). However, when α = 0.5, the integrated retailer tends
to exert more market power than its competitors (movement to the lower-right).
3.4 Firm Learning, Behaviour and Market Outcomes
Through their dynamic trading interaction, firms learn to prioritise those bid-
ding strategies that achieve higher payoﬀs and choose them more often. Each
firm’s price setting frequency is related to the strategy reinforcement, and once
marginal supply and demand patterns are established, price regularities follow.
The results suggest a link between reward interdependence, firm learning, trad-
ing behaviour and market outcomes.
As reward interdependences increase, the retail SBU submits higher bids,
sets prices more often and increases them markedly, albeit at the expense of
market share. However, wholesale prices are bounded below retail prices due
to the netback procedure. A higher retail price shifts up the wholesale demand
curve and, thus, provides more scope for higher wholesale prices. Then, the
wholesale SBU trades more often on the baseload, making it easier for its op-
ponent to increase prices. As a consequence, the integrated firm improves its
upstream market share and profitability, and this has a positive eﬀect on the
total profits of the vertically integrated firm.
Our results yield prices that are superficially equivalent to those of fore-
closure, which, by construction, cannot occur in our setting. We uncover a
diﬀerent mechanism to exert vertical market power in which the downstream
SBU behaves less competitively, gives up market share and pushes up retail
prices, rather than benefit from its’ rivals’ higher costs, as in Ordover et al. The
identification of this mechanism is this paper’s main economic policy contribu-
tion.
13Notice that how competitive the strategies are is determined with respect to the maximum
bid, and therefore more competitive strategies could translate into higher absolute bids.
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Pg Pe Pc
Separation (α = 0) 59 83 124
Shipper-Generator (α = .5) 63 93 125
+6.77% +12.04% +0.88%
Shipper-Retailer (α = .5) 67 95 144
+15% +14.45% +16.12%
Generator-Retailer (α = .5) 63 88 136
+6.77% +6.02% +9.67%
Table 1: Average Prices for a market with two gas shippers, three electricity
generators, and four electricity retailers.
4 Extensions
Generators may buy their inputs in wholesale markets one step up in the value
chain. For example, gas sold in the wholesale market may be an input for the
generation of the electricity traded in the wholesale electricity market that, in
turn, is sold to end users in the retail market. This section extends the previous
analysis from two to three tiers. We also analyse whether the results depend on
the position of the vertically integrated SBUs in the value chain and on market
concentration levels.
4.1 Three-tier Markets
Consider three sequential energy markets, with the same characteristics as be-
fore.14 Suppose that in the gas market there are two upstream natural gas
shippers that sell gas to three electricity generators. These generators buy gas
to produce electricity and sell it in the wholesale electricity market to four elec-
tricity retailers, who re-sell in the end-user market.
New simulations analyse reward interdependences between a gas shipper and
a generator plus those between a gas shipper and a retailer and a generator and
a retailer, keeping all other parameters constant. Table 1 summarises results
for α = 0 and α = .5 in these new simulations.
Similar to the previous results, reward interdependences between a natural
gas shipper and an electricity generator result in an increase in both wholesale
gas and electricity markets. Wholesale gas prices, P g, increase from an average
of 59 for α = 0 to 63 when α = .5 (+6.77%) whereas wholesale electricity
prices, P e, increase from 83 to 93 (+12.04%). Interestingly, there is a negligible
change in retail electricity prices, P c (+0.88%), and therefore end-users would
not be hurt here. Market prices seem to indicate that retailers are particularly
damaged from reward interdependences between a gas shipper and a generator.
Two complementary findings emerge from the simulated consequences of
reward interdependences linking the fortunes of a natural gas shipper and a
14See the working paper version of the paper for more details on the model and results, as
well as for additional figures, for this three-tier case.
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Pg Pe Pc
Separation (α = 0) 71 100 143
Shipper-Generator (α = .5) 73 108 143
+2.81% +8% 0%
Table 2: Average Prices for a market with two gas shippers, two electricity
generators, and two electricity retailers.
retailer. First, retail prices increase from an average of 124 for α = 0 to 144
when α = .5 (+16.12%), compared to a negligible change when α links a shipper
and a generator. Reward interdependence induces the retailer to implement a
less competitive—mixed strategy through which the firm becomes price setting
more often with the retail price increasing steadily.
Secondly, wholesale prices increase, too. The eﬀect on retail prices moves
up in the value chain. It translates into higher wholesale electricity and gas
prices from about 83 to 95 (+14.45%) and 59 to 67 (+15%), respectively. Re-
ward interdependences hurt end users in this case. Although the generators’
probability priors and trading behaviour change little, the integrated shipper
becomes more competitive and facilitates the exertion of market power by its
upstream rival, which leads to a wholesale electricity-gas diﬀerence similar to
the initial case. Moreover, by construction, higher retail prices widen the range
within which wholesale electricity prices are determined. With a constant num-
ber of bidding strategies, Si, similar generators’ probability distributions result
in higher wholesale prices as the retail price increases.
The simulations assuming integration between a generator and a retailer
show increases in wholesale electricity and retail prices (+6.02% and +9.67%).
The downstream unit manages to leverage its overall revenue and implement
a more collusive mixed strategy that expands the base for higher wholesale
electricity prices. The upstream unit, on the other hand, bids more often on the
base-load part of the su ply curve, with the other generators setting (higher)
prices. It is interesting to note how the non-integrated gas shippers capture a
large proportion of the rent through a higher wholesale natural gas increase of
6.77%.
4.2 Symmetric Market Structure across Tiers
In the previous analysis, market structure remained progressively less concen-
trated. The vertical foreclosure literature suggests that higher upstream con-
centration is an important element of the firms’ ability to exert vertical market
power. We check this result in our setting, through a symmetric-across-tiers
simulation.
Table 2 summarises market prices for the case in which there are two firms
in each tier. Vertical integration between a shipper and a generator leads, as in
the asymmetric case, to higher wholesale electricity and natural gas prices but
not higher end user prices. Higher prices with increasing α, therefore, hinge on
15
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the market clearing sequence rather than on market structure asymmetries.15
5 Discussion
The existence of interdependences between vertically related SBUs has become
a bedrock in the business strategy literature, yet we know relatively little about
the forces shaping these interdependences and their eﬀects. A set of agent-
based simulations identifies one such eﬀect in the de-regulated energy industry.
Reward interdependences between SBUs lead to trading coordination and higher
prices. Under tight reward interdependence structures, vertically integrated
firms increase the scope for upstream profits. This leads to strategic behaviour
with the superficial appearance of foreclosure, but based on a quite diﬀerent
principle. This paper adds to the preceding literature in at least three ways.
Methodologically, we are not aware of any other multi-tier energy simulations
driven by netback principles in the literature. The financial dependence between
electricity and natural gas markets does not seem to be captured by the classical
models of vertical foreclosure, where causal pricing relationships are sequential
from the upstream to the downstream segment.
The second contribution relates to the literature on the sources of vertical
market power in the energy industry (e.g. Bushnell et al. 2005, Granitz and
Klein 1996, Kühn and Machado 2004). The simulations suggest a new mecha-
nism to solve the puzzle of how vertical market power appears in some energy
markets where it should not. The downstream unit submits higher bids and
increases retail prices. As a result, the range of possible upstream prices also
increases. Then, the upstream unit stays on the baseload part of the supply
curve, increases its market share and allows its opponent to increase wholesale
prices. Hence, vertical market power emerges in a compulsory, uniform price
auction without trading internalisation or price discrimination.
Thirdly, the research identifies a link between internal incentive structures,
SBU behaviour and firm performance. Reward interdependence has been shown
to be an instrument leading to market power via higher vertical SBU coordina-
tion. Ways in which reward interdependences can be articulated include direct
bonuses and stock options, and casual evidence indicates that these are wide-
spread in the energy industry. It is interesting to note that such reward inter-
dependence contracts are internal to the firm and, hence, normally fall outside
the scope for regulatory intervention. Whether firms use them explicitly as a
way of aligning their interests to those of their SBU employees is an interesting
question for future empirical work.
15Results under two symmetric firms in two tiers and three symmetric firms in three tiers
are qualitatively equivalent to the case of two symmetric firms in three tiers.
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